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ABSTRACT 
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS OF URANIUM STORAGE FACILITY WITH FORMATION 
RACKS. Uranium materials are needed for the uranium fuel production of research reactors and 
radioisotope. Before the uranium material is used, it is stored in the storage facility. One of the 
prerequisites for uranium material storage facilities is that it must be in the sub-critical condition. The 
purpose of this study is to analyze the criticality condition of uranium material storage facility located in 
PT. Inuki (Persero) and to ensure that the criticality condition is always in sub-critical state. Criticality 
analysis was performed using MCNP-5 program to determine the level of criticality of the three uranium 
material storage facilities at initial conditions and conditions after adding the storage racks. For analysing 
storage facilities 1 and 2, three scenarios of container on the storage rack formations were considered. 
Meanwhile, for analysing the storage facility 3, one scenario was considered. The results confirm that all 
strorages at initial condition and after adding storage racks formation were still in sub-critical condition 
(k-eff<1). These results are then used as the basis for the uranium materials management. It is also used 
as a basis for issuing an operational license by the nuclear energy regulatory body (BAPETEN). 
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ABSTRAK 
 
ANALISIS KRITIKALITAS DI FASILITAS PENYIMPANAN BAHAN URANIUM DENGAN 
FORMASI PENGATURAN RAK. Bahan uranium dibutuhkan untuk produksi bahan bakar reaktor 
penelitian dan radioisotop. Bahan uranium sebelum digunakan terlebih dahulu disimpan pada fasilitas 
penyimpanan. Salah satu prasyarat fasilitas penyimpanan bahan uranium adalah fasilitas tersebut harus 
dalam kondisi sub-kritis. Bila kondisi kritis terjadi mengakibatkan proses fissi pada bahan uranium tidak 
terkendali, sehingga akan menimbulkan suhu yang sangat tinggi. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk 
menganalisa kondisi kritikalitas dari fasilitas penyimpanan bahan uranium yang berada di PT. INUKI 
(Persero) untuk menjamin fasilitas tersebut dalam kondisi sub-kritis. Analisis kritikalitas dilakukan 
menggunakan program MCNP-5 untuk mengetahui tingkat kritikalitas dari tiga fasilitas penyimpanan 
bahan uranium untuk kondisi awal dan kondisi setelah ditambahkan rak penyimpanan. Untuk fasilitas 
penyimpanan 1 dan 2 dibuat tiga skenario pengaturan container pada rak penyimpanan, sedangkan pada 
fasilitas penyimpanan 3 dilakukan 1 skenario.  Hasil ini menunjukkan seluruh fasilitas penyimpanan 
pada kondisi awal dan setelah ditambah rak penyimpanan dalam kondisi sub-kritis (k-eff<1). Hasil 
tersebut selanjutnya dipergunakan sebagai dasar untuk menyusun manejemen pengelolaan bahan 
uranium. Selain itu juga digunakan sebagai dasar untuk pembuatan ijin dari badan pengawas 
(BAPETEN). 
 
Kata Kunci : kritikalitas, fasilitas penyimpanan berbahan uranium,  k-eff 
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INTRODUCTION 
Radioisotope and fuel production require low enriched uranium (LEU). Uranium materials 
require storage facility prior to use. Storages of uranium materials have prerequisites, among others, 
where it should be in a sub-critical condition. These prerequisites must be satisfied since if critical 
conditions occur, it will cause the uncontrolled fission on uranium material. As a result, a high heat 
is generated in the uranium material, which could melt the uranium material itself. Melting of 
uranium materials will lead to the release of fission products in the form of radioactive materials 
into the environment and can be hazardous to people as well as the environment. 
Criticality calculations are performed at nuclear facilities, fuel storage, and storage of 
uranium materials. The analysis was performed to ensure existing facilities in sub-critical condition 
to avoid uncontrolled fission reactions and high temperature in the facilities. Criticality calculations 
can be done using a variety of computer program such as MCNP-5 computer code, which is based 
on Monte Carlo method [1]. Critical analysis on various cases have been done by previous 
investigators, for example, on various geometry fuel arrangement by Doddy Kastanya [2],  TRIGA 
Mark II reactor first criticality by D. Alloni et.al [3], as well as the fuel storage facility at the 
TRIGA Mark II research reactor by Loren R Metthew [4]. It also has been carried out for criticality 
calculation of high temperature reactors, research reactors and other criticality problems. Criticality 
calculations for high temperature power reactor as for the pebble and HTR reactor criticality has 
been conducted by Meng-Jen W, et al, Meng-Jen W, et al, Evi Setiawati, at al and several other 
researchers [5–11]. For the calculation of criticality at research reactor as in the Ghana LEU 
research reactor has been conducted by Henry Cecil O [12]. In addition, the calculation of the other 
criticality calculations for effect of difference nuclear library, influence of normalization flux and 
influence of geometry models have been done by R. Mosteller et al, Gasper Zerovnik and 
Christopher R. Hughes, et al respectively [13–15]. 
 Criticality research has been done around the reactors and spent fuel storage facility and no 
one has been done on uranium material storage facilities. The purpose of this study was to analyse 
the criticality condition of the uranium material storage facility in the PT. INUKI (Persero). This 
study was conducted to determine the criticality condition of the storage facilities 1, 2 and 3 at the 
initial conditions and at the condition with additional storage racks. At the storage facility 1 and 2, 
which contain storage racks, analysis was made in three scenarios, while for the storage facility 3 
was made just one scenario. 
The first step in this analysis is to make the cell calculation model for uranium material that 
will be stored in a storage facility. Furthermore, the density atom calculations are performed for all 
material in the cell calculation. Atomic density calculations are also done for all material in the 
system calculation. The Atomic density obtained in the cell and system model are used as an input 
to the MCNP-5 codes. Both of these inputs are used in the calculation of criticality of the system 
storage facility for the current condition and the condition after storage racks are installed. Further 
analysis is to determine the level of criticality of the system of fuel storage facility for the current 
condition and the condition after storage racks. Results are used for the fuel management as well as 
the basis for uranium materials management license from the regulatory body 
(BAPETEN/Indonesia Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency) 
THEORY  
MNCP-5 Computer Program 
Criticality analysis can be performed using a MCNP-5 program package. MCNP-5 is a 
computer program used to analyze the particle flux by the Monte Carlo method. Monte Carlo 
method is a method of solving the problem of neutron transport in a way to simulate the trail of 
particles to follow the lead of the particles since the "birth" followed step by step in a medium that 
has been defined until the neutron particles are diminished from the medium, followed by other 
particles sequentially. For neutron flux calculation, a library of cross-section for the medium 
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through which the particles neutrons (σ1, σ2, σ3 ....) has been available in the package, while the 
probability of particles neutrons interacting medium that is passed is determined randomly by plant 
random number (random number generator), for it takes the density of the medium as an the 
program. The number of neutron particle that passes through a medium is calculated (scored), the 
number of neutrons is the neutron flux at the point observed[1].  
Precision of the calculation packages of MCNP-5 program is determined by three 
parameters, namely; 
a. The error relative to the 1-sigma standard deviation, which is defined as: 𝑅 = 𝑆!𝑥  (1) 
with 𝑆!  is the standard deviation, 𝑥 is the price of the average flux count. Calculations with 
location detection point (point detector) is considered to meet the criteria if R < 0,05. 
b. Variance of Variance (VOV), which is defined as;: 𝑉𝑂𝑉 = (𝑥! − 𝑥)!!!!![ (𝑥! − 𝑥)!!!!! ]! = 1𝐶 (2) 
where C is a count of particles. Calculations with accuracy MVNP considered eligible if the  
VOV value is < 0,1.  
c. Figure of Merit (FOM), which is defined as;: 𝐹𝑂𝑀 = 1𝑅𝑇 (3) 
where T is simulation time. The results of computer simulations considered carefully when 
FOM is relatively constant value for each sequence capture particles traced. If the parameter is 
not reached, then calculation is repeated by adding traced neutron or computer calculation 
time until the parameter value is reached. 
d. Geometry and Cross-section data 
Input data for MCNP-5 code are comprised of the geometry specification and the cross-section 
data. The required data of the geometry specification involves of the 2 or 3 dimensional 
geometric shapes, the volume of material composition and also the material mass. For the 
cross-section data require the material composition, the energy for neutron fission reaction and 
the cross-section data library as a function of energy 
Determination of the mass fraction and volume fraction and atomic densitiy of chemical 
elements of a material 
The mass, mass fraction, volume fraction and atomic density of a chemical element are 
required as inputs to the MCNP-5 computer program. The chemical element is a medium through 
which a neutron particle. It is an observation point where there is a trail of neutron from birth until 
it disappeared from the media. To determine the mass fraction and the volume fraction, the atomic 
density building blocks of matter is required. The material volume data is also required. The 
formula for determining the mass fraction, volume fraction and the atomic density are as follows. 
For an example, the material of UO2 has a density ρ(uo2) (g/cm3), with enrichment of ω % 
and Molar weigh of UO2, U, U-235, U-238 and Oxigen are M(UO2), M(U), M(U-235), M(U-
238) and M(O) respectively, then the steps are: 
- Determining the mass of material (gram) 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 =  ω 𝑥 𝑀 𝑈 − 235  +  1 −  𝜔  𝑥 𝑀(𝑈 − 238) ω 𝑥 𝑀 𝑈 − 235  +  1 −  𝜔  𝑥 𝑀 𝑈 − 238  +  2 𝑋 𝑀(𝑂)  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑓 UO!   (4) 
  Mass of Oxygen =  M O ω x M U − 235  +  1 −  ω  x M U − 238  +  2 X M(O)  x mas of UO!   (5) 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 − 235 =  ω x Mass of U (6) 
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𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 − 238 = (1 −  ω) x Mass of U (7) 
- Determining the mass fraction and volume fraction of material 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 − 235 = 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 − 235𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑂!  (8) 
  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 − 238 = 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 − 238𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑂!  (9) 
  
Volume fraction of U = 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑂! 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑈𝑂! 
 
(10) 
  Volume fraction of Oksigen = 1 − Volume fraction of U (11) 
 
- Determining the atomic density (atom/cm3) Number density of U − 235 =  ω x ρ(uo2) /M(U − 235)x( M UM UO! ) (12) 
  Number density of U − 238 =  ω x ρ(uo2) /M(U − 238)x( M UM UO! ) (13) 
  Number density of Oxygen =  ω x ρ(uo2) /M(O)x( M UM UO! ) (14) 
METHODOLOGY 
CELL MODEL FOR URANIUM 
The uranium cell consists of two types of cylindrical containers, which are made of uranium, 
of which 1 piece of container is loaded with natural UO2 with mass of 1.273 kg and 1 piece of 
container loaded with depleted uranium metal with mass of 3.576 kg. Each container has a diameter 
of 14 cm and 17 cm, respectively.  
SYSTEM MODEL FOR THREE STORAGE FACILITIES 
System Model for Current Storage Facility 
Sorage Facility 1 
Storage facility 1 is a room measuring of 3.36 m long, 3.10 m wide and 5.25 m high.  
Storage facility 1 in the current condition contains 10 pieces of containers loaded with natural UO2 
each of mass 1.273 kg and 10 containers loaded with depleted uranium metal each of mass 3.576 
kg. Each container has a diameter of 14 cm and 17 cm [16]. Each container has designed of 30 cm 
distance from each other. The container is made of plastic.  
Storage Facility 2 
Storage facility 2 is a room measuring of 3.36 m long, 3.10 m wide and 5.25 m high. The 
storage facility 2 currently contains five pieces of container loaded with natural UO2 each of mass 
0.106 kg and 5 pieces of container loaded with a mass of 18.418 kg UF4. Each container has a 
diameter of 30 cm and 34 cm high [16]. Each container has been designed to have a space of 70 cm 
from each other. The container is made of iron.  
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Storage Facility 3 
The storage facility 3 is a room measuring of 3.36 m long, 3.10 m wide and 5.25 m high. The 
condition of storage facility 3 currently contains 20 pieces of container-laden natural UCaF2 each 
of mass 2.373 kg with 19.75% enrichment; and 20 pieces of metal container-laden with uranium 
enrichment, 19.75% enrichment with the mass of 7.111 kg. Model calculations can be seen in 
Figure 4. Each container has a diameter of 10 cm and 23 cm high [16]. Each container has been 
designed of a space 30 cm from each other. The container is made of iron.  
System Model with Storage Racks 
Storage Facility 1 
Storage facility 1 was designed to contain 2 storage racks separated by a distance of 1 m. 
Each storage rack consists of 3 levels of shelves. 
The ground floor of each shelf contains 2 x 4 units of container and each container of 30 cm 
diameter and 70 cm high. The container which is located on the ground floor, on the first shelf and 
the second shelf were loaded with UCaF2 with mass of 2.373 kg with 19.75% enrichment and 
7.111 kg uranium metal with 19.75% enrichment [16]. Each container has designed of 50 cm apart 
from each other. 
Furthermore, every shelf level consists of 3 x 6 containers. Containers at all shelves are 14 
cm in diameter and 17 cm high. Each container is separated by 39.5 cm. All containers made of 
iron. 
a. The first scenario  
- The ground floor contains 2x4 containers, 4 containers were each loaded with UCaF2 mass 
of 2.373 kg with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers each loaded with metal 
Uranium mass of 7.111 kg with 19.75% enrichment. 
- The first rack and a second rack each consisting of three shelves. The first to third shelves, 
where contain of 6 containers each. The entire racks contain of 36 containers with the mass 
of each container was 1.273 kg of natural UO2.  
b. The second scenario  
- The ground floor contains 2x4 containers, 4 containers each loaded with 2.373 kg UCaF2 
with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers each loaded with 7.111 kg metal Uranium 
with 19.75% enrichment. 
- The first and the second rack consist of three shelves. All shelves contain 6 containers 
each. The entire rack contains 36 containers where each container has 3.576 kg natural 
uranium metal depletion. 
c. The third scenario 
- The ground floor of each rack contains 2x4 containers, 4 containers each loaded with 2.373 
kg UCaF2 with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers each loaded with 7.111 kg metal 
Uranium with 19.75% enrichment.  
- The first rack contain 3 shelves, each shelf contains 6 containers and each container 
containing 1.273 kg of natural UO2. The entire first rack consists of 18 containers. 
- The second rack contain 3 shelves, each shelf contains 6 containers and each container 
containing 3.576 kg of natural uranium metal depletion. The entire second rack consists of 
18 containers. 
Storage Facility 2 
Storage facility 2 was designed to contain 2 storage racks that separated by a distance of 1m. 
Each storage rack comprises of a base and two levels of shelves.  
The ground floor of each shelf hold 2 x 4 pieces of containers and each container has 30 cm 
diameter and 70 cm high. On the first and the second shelf were loaded with 2.373 kg UCaF2 with   
0.7% enrichment and 7.111 kg uranium metal with 0.7% enrichment. Each container was 50 cm 
apart from each other. 
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Furthermore, each level consists of a rack 2 x 4 containers. The diameter and height of each 
container is 30 cm and 34 cm respectively. Each container as far apart as 50 cm and containers 
made of iron. 
a. The first scenario  
- The ground floor contains 2x4 container, 4 containers were loaded with 2.373 kg UCaF2 
with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers loaded with 7.111 kg metal Uranium with 
19.75% enrichment. 
- The first rack and a second rack consist of 2 shelves. Each shelf contains of 4 containers. 
The entire racks contain of 16 containers, each container has 0.106 kg of natural U3O8.  
b. The second scenario  
- The ground floor contains 2x4 container, 4 containers were loaded with 2.373 kg UCaF2 
with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers loaded with 7.111 kg metal Uranium with 
19.75% enrichment. 
- The first rack and a second rack each consisting of 2 shelves. Each shelf contains of 4 
containers. The entire racks contain of 16 containers, each container has 18.418 kg of 
natural UF4. 
c. The third scenario 
- The ground floor of each rack of 2x4 containers, 4 containers each charged UCaF2 mass of 
2.373 kg with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers each charged metal Uranium 
enrichment mass of 7.111 kg with 19.75%.   
- The first rack consists of 2 shelves. Each shelf contains of 4 containers. The entire racks 
contain of 8 containers, each container has 0.106 kg of natural U3O8  
- The second rack consisits 2 shelves. Each shelf contains of 4 containers. The entire racks 
contain of 8 containers, each container has 18.418 kg of natural UF4. 
Storage Facility 3 
Storage facility 3 was designed to contain 2 storage racks that separated by a distance of 1 m. 
Each storage rack is consisting of the base and 3 levels of shelves.  
The ground floor of each shelf was containing 3 x 6 pieces of container and each container of       
30 cm diameter and 70 cm high. The container which is located on the ground floor, on the first 
shelf and the second shelf were loaded with UCaF2 with mass of 2,373 kg with 19.75% enrichment 
and 7.111 kg uranium metal with 19.75% enrichment. Each container was 50 cm apart from each 
other. 
Furthermore, every shelf level consists of (3 x 6) containers. Containers at the entire shelves 
have 14 cm in diameter and 17 cm high. Each container is separated by 39.5 cm and containers 
made of iron. 
The first scenario  
- The ground floor contains 2x4 containers, 4 containers each loaded with 2,373 kg UCaF2 
with 19.75% enrichment, and 4 other containers each loaded with 7.111 kg metal Uranium 
with 19.75% enrichment. 
- The first rack and a second rack each consisting of three shelves: the first shelf to the third 
shelf, where every shelf contains 6 containers. The entire rack contains 36 containers with 
each container has 5.337 kg of  U3Si2 19.75% enrichment. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
CELL MODEL FOR URANIUM 
In Figure 1, it is shown in the left-hand side the model for a front view of the container, 
while the right image is modeling for top view of the container. Red color indicates a material 
homogenization of uranium materials inside the container and blue is the homogenization of the 
material contained. 
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Figure 1. The cell model for uranium materials 
 
SYSTEM MODEL FOR THREE STORAGE FACILITIES 
1. System Model for Initial Condition Storage Facility 
 
Sorage Facility 1 
 
 Figure 2 in the left hand-side shows the image model of the view from the front, while in the 
right-hand side shows a view from above. Figure 2 represents the material uranium only in one 
level and consists of two types (natural UO2 and depleted uranium metal), and each type consisting 
of 2x5 container. 
 
	
Figure 2. System model for a storage facility 1 in the current condition 
Storage Facility 2 
 
 Figure 3 depicts the view from the front (left-hand side), whiles the image to the right-
hand side, and shows a view from above. Figure 3 represents material uranium only in one level 
and consists of two types (natural UO2 and UCaF2), and each type is composed of five 
containers. 
 
 
Figure 3. System model for storage facility 2 in current condition 
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Storage Facility 3 
 
 Figure 4 shows for the image model of the view from the front (left-hand side), while the 
model image to the right, shows a view from above. Figure 4 represents the material uranium 
only in one level and consists of two types (natural UCaF2 and uranium metal), and each 
consisting of 4x5 container types. 
 
 
Figure 4. System model for the storage facility 3 in current condition 
2. System Model with Storage Racks 
Storage Facility 1 
 
 Figure 5 shows the first rack, which is represented by models 1 (front view) and 2 (side 
view), and the second rack, which is represented by models 3 (front view) and 4 (side view).  It 
is shown in Figure 5 also that uranium materials at a lower shelf consist of 2 uranium types 
(UCaF2 and uranium metal). Each shelf consisted of four containers. In the entire three shelves 
consists of one type of uranium (UO2/uranium metal), and was simulated into three scenarios.  
Scenario 1: the entire racks consist of UO2 and contain 36 containers. Scenario 2:  the entire 
racks consist of uranium metal and contain 36 containers. Scenario 3: The entire first rack 
consists of UO2 (18 containers) and the entire second rack consists of ranium metal (18 
containers). 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
Figure 5. System model for storage facility 1 with first and second racks 
 
Storage Facility 2 
 
 Figure 6 depicts the first rack, which is represented by models 1 (front view) and 2 (side 
view), and the second rack, which is represented by models 3 (front view) and 4 (side view). It 
is also shown in Figure 5 that uranium materials at lower shelf consists of 2 uranium types 
(UCaF2 and uranium metal). In the entire racks consists of one type of uranium (U3O8/UF4), and 
P-ISSN: 1411–240X E-ISSN: 2527-9963 
Nomor: 632/AU3/P2MI-LIPI/03/2015 
(Masa Berlaku Akreditasi s/d Mei 2018)	
Criticality Analysis Of Uranium Storage … 
(Sri Kuntjoro) 
 
 49 
 
was simulated into three scenarios. Scenario 1: the entire racks consist of U308 and contain 16 
containers. Scenario 2: The entire racks consist of UF4 and contain 16 containers. Scenario 3: 
The entire first rack consists of U308 (8 containers) and the entire second rack consists of UF4 (8 
containers). 
 
 
Figure 6. The system models the storage facility with the first rack and a second rack 
 
Storage Facility 3 
 
 Figure 7 depicts the first rack, which is represented by models 1 (front view) and 2 (side 
view), and the second rack, which is represented by models 3 (front view) and 4 (side view). It 
is also shown in Figure 5 that uranium materials at lower shelf consists of 2 uranium types 
(UCaF2 and uranium metal).  On the third level rack consists of one type of material uranium 
(U3Si2), and simulated into one scenario that is the entire shelf in the entire rack consists U3Si2 
in 36 containers. 
 
 
Figure 7. The system models the third storage facility with the first rack and a second rack 
 
Futhermore after all the model is defined, the calculation is carried to determine the 
volume fraction and the density of atoms for every material used in the storage facilities 1, 2 and 
3 using the formula (4) to (11) and the results can be seen in Table 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 1. Material input MCNP-5 for the initial condition of storage facilities 1 
Material Mass of Atom 
Density 
(gram/cm3) 
Enrichment 
(%) 
Mass 
(gram) 
% 
Weight 
Atomic 
Density 
UO2 - 10.97 0.70 1273  - 
U 237.45 11.3 - -  - 
U-235 235.04 - - - 0.007 1.28E-04 
U-238 238.05 - - - 0.993 1.79E-02 
O 16.00 - - -  2.44E-03 
N 14.00 -  -  3.89E-10 
C 12.00 -  -  5.63E-12 
       
Plastic       
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Material Mass of Atom 
Density 
(gram/cm3) 
Enrichment 
(%) 
Mass 
(gram) 
% 
Weight 
Atomic 
Density 
C 12.00    0.8562 - 
H 1.01    0.1438 - 
       
U metal - 18.95 0.07 3576  - 
U-235 235.04 - - - 0.007 6.14E-04 
U-238 238.05 - - - 0.993 8.68E-02 
       
Air - 0.0012 - -  - 
C 12.00 - - -  7.45E-06 
N 14.00 - - -  3.84E-05 
O 16.00 - - -  1.03E-05 
Ar 39.95 - - -  2.28R-07 
Ne 20.17 - - -  4.24E-10 
He 4.00 - - -  1.25E-10 
Kr 83.78 - - -  2.55E-11 
H 1.01 - - -  4.19E-13 
Xe 131.26 - - -  2.17E-12 
 
Table 1 shows that the material, which can be stored in Storage Facility 1 are OU2 with 1273 
gr mass and Uranium Metal with 3576 gr mass. Two uranium types, which will be placed in 
container, are built from plastic material. OU2 material consists of 1.28E-04 atom/cm3 of U-235 and 
7.21E-03 atom/cm3 of U-238 and uranium metal consists of 6.14E-04 atom/cm3 of U-235 and 
8.68E-02 atom/cm3 of U-238. This case shows that the U-235 mass in UO2 and uranium metal 
material is very small compare to the U-238 mass. It is because the enrichment of uranium in UO2 
and uranium metal is quite small at 0.7%. It also shows that the number of U-235 in uranium metal 
more than in UO2, this is because the uranium metal mass is greater than the UO2 mass. 
    Table 2. Material input MCNP-5 for initial conidition of storage facilities 2 
Material	 Atomic weight	
Density 
(gram/cm3)	
Enrichmnt 
(%)	
Mass 
(gram)	
%  
Weight	
Atomic 
Density	
U3O8	 -	 8.30	 0.70	 106	 -	 -	
U	 237.45	 11.3	 -	 -	 -	 -	
U-235	 235.04	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.49E-06	
U-238	 238.05	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.98E-06	
O	 16.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.19E-04	
N	 14.00	 -	  -	 -	 8.41E-06	
C	 12.00	 -	  -	 -	 1.21E-05	
Container	       
Fe	 55.84	 7.87	 -	 -	 -	 -	
UF4	 -	 6.70	 0.70	 18984	  -	
U-235	 235.04	 -	 -	 -	 0.007	 1.04E-05	
U-238	 238.05	 -	 -	 -	 0.993	 1.46E-03	
F	 19.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.87E-03	
C	 12.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.81E-08	
O	 16.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.13E-08	
N	 14.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6.96E-10	
Air	 -	 0.0012	 -	 -	 -	 -	
C	 12.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7.45E-06	
N	 14.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3.84E-05	
O	 16.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.03E-05	
Ar	 39.95	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.28R-07	
Ne	 20.17	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.24E-10	
He	 4.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.25E-10	
Kr	 83.78	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.55E-11	
H	 1.01	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.19E-13	
Xe	 131.26	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.17E-12	
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Table 2 shows that the material, which can be stored in Storage Facility 1, are O3U8 with 106 
gr mass and UF4 with 18418 gr mass. Two uranium types, which will be placed in container, is 
built from plastic material. O3U8 material consists of 1.49E-06 atom/cm3 of  U-235 and 5.98E-06 
atom/cm3 of U-238. While UF4 material consists of 1.04E-05 atom/cm3 of  U-235 and  1.46E-03 
atom/cm3 of U-238. It also shows that the mass of U-235 on UF4 is greater than U3O8, this is due to 
the enrichment of both materials is the same, but the mass of UF4 has greater than the mass of 
U3O8. 
       Table 3. Material input MCNP-5 for initial condition of storage facilities 3 
Material	 Atomic weight	
Density 
(gram/cm3)	
Enrichment 
(%)	
Mass 
(gram)	
%  
Weight	
Atomic 
Density	
U3Si2	 -	 12.20	 19.75	 5337	  -	
U	 237.45	 11.3	 -	 -	  -	
U-235	 235.04	 -	 -	 -	 0.1975	 4.24E-03	
U-238	 238.05	 -	 -	 -	 0.8125	 1.70E-02	
Si	 28.08	 -	 -	 -	  1.67E-03	
O	 16.00	 -	 -	 -	  8.21E-11	
N	 14.00	 -	  -	  3.50E-10	
C	 12.00	 -	  -	  5.06E-12	
Container	       
Fe	 55.84	 7.87	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Air	 -	 0.0012	 -	 -	 -	 -	
C	 12.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7.45E-06	
N	 14.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3.84E-05	
O	 16.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.03E-05	
Ar	 39.95	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.28R-07	
Ne	 20.17	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.24E-10	
He	 4.00	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.25E-10	
Kr	 83.78	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.55E-11	
H	 1.01	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.19E-13	
Xe	 131.26	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.17E-12	
Table 3 shows that the material, which can be stored in Storage Facility 1, is O3Si2 with 5337 
gr mass. Only once uranium types, which will be placed in container, is built from iron. O3Si2 
material consists of 4.24E-03 atom/cm3 of U-235 and 1.70E-02 atom/cm3 of U-238. Mass of U-235 
in U3Si2 material has a large number, because the enrichment and mass of U3Si2 has a great values 
are 19.75%  and 5330 grams respectively.  
Of the three existing storage facilities, it is seen that the mass of uranium in each container in 
storage facility 3 is the largest U-235 mass compared to those in the storage facilities 1 and 2. The 
large amount of U-235 will generate a large probability of fission reactions, so that a critical 
condition will occurs sooner. Therefore forming material in the storage facilities 3 should be more 
attention. 
Further calculation is aimed to obtain the level of criticality of the storage facility 1 to 3. The 
results obtained are presented in Table 4 to Table 6.  
Table 4. Criticality level in storage facility 1 
No.	 Scenario	 K-eff	
1	 Initial current condition	 0.48171 ± 0.00155	
2	 First scenario 	 0.55478 ± 0.00123	
3	 Second scenario 	 0.55553 ± 0.00128	
4	 Third scenario 	 (0.55478 ≤ k-eff ≤  0.55553) ± 0.00128	
 
Table 4 shows that at the initial state, the storage facility 1 is in sub-critical condition (k-eff = 
0.48171 ± 0.00155). Condition storage facility 1 is safe because it is very far from the critical 
condition (k-eff = 1). Table 4 also shows that the storage facility 1 remains sub-critical after adding 
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2 storage shelves. The largest sub-critical condition is reached when the entire storage racks filled 
with depleted uranium metal container as many as 36 pieces (k-eff = 0.55553 ± 0.00128). 
Table 5. Criticality level in storage facility 2 
No.	 Scenario	 k-eff	
1	 Initial current condition	 0.12443 ± 0.00026	
2	 First scenario 	 0.56036 ± 0.00134	
3	 Second scenario 	 0.50841 ± 0.00117	
4	 Third scenario 	 (0.50841 ≤ k-eff ≤  0.56036) ± 0.00134	
From Table 5, it appears that the initial conditions of the storage facility are also sub-critical    
(k-eff=0.12443±0.00026). Of the three scenarios fuel storage in the storage rack, the largest 
criticality condition is reached in the second shelf, which is filled with U3O8 as many as 16 
containers (k-eff =0.56036 ±0.00134). 
Table 6. Criticality level in storage facility 3 
No.	 Scenario	 k-eff	
1	 Initial current condition	 0.72995 ± 0.00166	
2	 First scenario 	 0.96509 ± 0.00132	
Table 6 shows that the initial condition at the storage facility 3 is in the sub-critical condition   
with k-eff=(0.72995±0.00166). Subcritical stay remains after the entire shelf filled with U3Si2 as 
many as 36 containers with k-eff =0.96509 ± 0.00132. 	
Based on Table 4 to Table 6, it can be seen that the largest sub-critical condition in the 
storage facility 3. Based on the results it can be concluded that the entire three storage facilities in 
sub-critical conditions even with additional storage racks.	
The fuel storage management was made based on the results. The goal of the management is 
so that each container position can be known in the storage area as well as the amounts of uranium 
inside the container is traceable. Uranium stoprage facility system management is accomplished 
through numbering the storage facilities.  The container numbering is proposed as follows: 
 
Container Number = FN-D/RM-YX 
where: 
F = Storage fasility  	
N = Storage fasility   1/2/3	
D/R  = Ground/Rack	
M = Base or Rack 1/2	
Y = Front view of the foremost 1/2/3	
X = Side view of the leftmost. 1/2/3/4/5/6 
 
Example:  
A container is in storage facility 2. an place on the second rack in position number 2 from the front 
and the third from the left. For this condition the Number of container is namely F2-R2-23 
Monitoring Cards here after is devised to monitor the container as well as materials such in Tabel 7. 
Table 7. Card monitoring uranium materials  
Container Number: F2-R2-23 
No.	 Date	 Type of Uranium	
Initial 
Mass 
(Kg)	
Addition Mass 
(kg)	
Taken-out 
Mass (kg)	
End 
Condition 
Mass (Kg)	
Name/	
sign	
1	 02/01/17	 U3O8	 5.50	 -	 -	 5.50	  
2	 10/03/17	 U3O8	 5.50	 2.75	 -	 8.25	  
3	 15/03/17	 U3O8	 8.25	 -	 1.00	 7.25	  
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With the monitoring card as seen in Table 7, each container and its contents can be monitored and 
traced the amount of uranium that exists, and it history when added, retrieved, and is done by 
anyone. Thus it will be avoided uranium discharge to place unwanted and which will be hazardoues 
to workers, public and environtment because it is polluted by uranium. 
CONCLUSION 
The criticality Analysis of the storage facility has been completed. Criticality analysis results 
on the initial conditions for the three storage facilities are k-eff<1. As for the three storage facilities 
after the addition of storage racks resulted the lcriticality level in storage facilities 1,2 and 3 are also      
k-eff<1. All the storage facilities in a safe condition where k-eff values still far from critical 
condition at a price of k-eff = 1.00. The results are then used as the basis for the uranium materials 
management. The uranium material storage management based on the analysis was created to 
monitor the uranium material from traceability and illicit trafficking. Apart from that, the analysis 
results can be used as the basis to get the license of uranium material management from the 
regulatory body (BAPETEN). 
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